

The Portrait of a Forgotten Meiji-Period Japanologist: Captain Francis Brinkley (1841–1912)¹

Alexandra MUSTĂŢEA

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Captain Francis Brinkley arrived in Japan shortly before the Meiji Restoration. He took his first steps on Japanese land when Tokyo was still Edo, when the small foreign community there still needed armed protection against rowdy *ronin* and disgruntled locals, and when members of this newly established community — most of them merchants and officials belonging to hegemonic Western empires — still felt like they had a huge role to play in ‘civilizing’ Japan and its people. By the time of his death in 1912, Japan had already gained its title as a modern nation, on par with the greatest Western powers. Its victory in the two wars around the turn of the 20th century had awed its former “mentors,” and Western perceptions of Japan were undergoing a significant shift.

Throughout all this, Brinkley proved himself an invaluable ally for Japan, who dedicated his life to the study and popularization of its language, history, and art. His English language textbook, *Gogaku hitori annai* (1895) and his *Unabridged Japanese–English Dictionary* (1896) proved invaluable resources for the study of (the English or Japanese) language in Meiji Japan; his dictionary had

more or less replaced the famous Hepburn Japanese–English dictionary (1867). He owned and edited one of the most influential and well-written newspapers of the era, the *Japan Mail*,² and he was a long-term correspondent of the *Times*. He was one of the founding members of the Asiatic Society of Japan, alongside Sir Ernest Satow and others, and he consistently published papers and books on Japan’s history, art, and political affairs. And yet — as the very few researchers writing about him note — his name and scholarship are rarely remembered nowadays, if at all.³ His name barely appears mentioned, even in recent histories of English-language Japanology: in Cortazzi and Kornicki’s 2016 *Japanese Studies in Britain: A Survey and History* (published by The Japan Society), for example, his name appears only in *passim*, as one of the members of the British Garrison that came to Yokohama between 1863 to 1875. In the part that discusses publications by these military and navy officers, Brinkley’s is altogether absent, although other controversial or less active writers of the time are referenced (e.g., Malcolm Kennedy, a business journalist). To this day, the only English-language studies that even mention him are, to the best of my knowledge, Hoare 1975 and 1999, Valiant 1974, O’Connor 2010, and Nagamori 2020. Hoare’s 1999 overview of Brinkley’s work, which is the most comprehensive and thorough to date, pens a damning indictment of the scholar:

“There were frequent references to a man who had been left behind as the world changed rapidly around him. [...] Japan, too, was different, and no longer needed foreign *apologists*. [...] Nor did he count in other ways. *Few of his British contemporaries in Japan held him in much esteem. His fellow editors attacked his pro-Japanese views and mocked his scholarship.* Scholars who shared his interests were [...] equally contemptuous. B.H. Chamberlain [...] felt that Brinkley was an awful warning of what happened if one got stuck in a rut. [...] Few now read his scholarly works, which, lacking the depth of his contemporaries like Chamberlain and Aston, have long since been replaced. His main monument remains the *Japan Mail*, still valued as a source for the history of the Meiji period. [...] As

Britain and Japan grew apart in the 1920s and 1930s, Brinkley's support for Japan, if remembered at all, was seen in a hostile light, and his reputation never recovered."⁴ [italics mine]

Hoare's account points to two central issues that may have led to Brinkley's stunted legacy as a Japanologist: one could be the poor quality of his scholarly work, an evaluation which is made in recent scholarship not by direct analysis of his work, but by reference to contemporary criticism made against Brinkley by some very prominent figures, scholarly or journalistic. Citing Basil Hall Chamberlain, who — writing about Brinkley in 1906 — described the latter as an “unsafe” guide in the history of Japan, on account of his “loose method” and a “lack of critical faculty,”⁵ Hoare concludes that Brinkley's work as a historian “was not even held in high regard at the time” and that neither of his two major works — *Japan and China: Their History, Arts, and Literature*, published between 1901 and 1904, or his posthumous *A History of the Japanese People from the Earliest Times to the End of the Meiji Period* — passed the test of time, on account of his “superseded” methods and approach in the field of art history and his (lack of) qualities as a historian. According to Hoare, the other possible reason why Brinkley's work came to be largely ignored is his reputation as an “apologist” — his “pro-Japanese” stance on almost every issue and the underlying assumption that his Japanophilia was not a matter of principle but a financially motivated one. The reasons for this widely held assumption about Brinkley — by his contemporaries and by more recent studies — are to be found in *Japan Mail's* subsidies from the Meiji government and its advocacy for Japan on the international stage, as well as in the scholar's intimate friendship with members of the Meiji oligarchy, like Itō Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru (one of the early Foreign Ministers) and Baron Mitsui, in whose house he lived

for many years, in Azabu.

While Brinkley's connections to the Meiji oligarchy and the financial support he received for his paper cannot be denied, a more nuanced contextualization is necessary. His poor reputation as a scholar and journalist in more recent studies — Hoare's included — seems to rely very heavily on evaluations penned by some of the scholar's most vocal and prominent contemporary critics, such as B.H. Chamberlain.⁶ However, a broader context of this criticism is conspicuously missing. Therefore, this paper aims to re-evaluate the scholar's status within the field of English-language Japanology in the Meiji period, as well as to explore an alternative — or at least a more nuanced — account of Brinkley's activity and the reasons why he could have slipped through the cracks in the field of English-language Japanology. With this aim, the first part of the paper will discuss the controversy surrounding Brinkley's editorial activity and the role of his paper in the history of Japanese journalism and the second part will explore Brinkley's status in the field of early English-language Japanology by looking at his relationship with two of his most prominent contemporary critics, B.H. Chamberlain and Sir E. Satow.

(I) Brinkley's editorial activity and the place of the Japan Mail in the history of Japanese journalism

The criticism of Brinkley's journalistic activity ranges from noting the *Japan Mail's* role in building Japan's international reputation, alongside the *Times* of London,⁷ to accusing Brinkley and his newspaper of being nothing more than a “government propaganda organ.”⁸ What is known for a fact is that Brinkley's paper, the *Japan Mail*, was one of the few English-language newspapers official-

ly supported by the Meiji government, alongside *Tokio Times* (E.H. House) and *The Japan Times* (Zumoto Motosada and Yamada Sueji).⁹ In the case of the *Mail*, The Meiji government bought 500 copies of each issue for distribution abroad, to publicize Japanese affairs in Europe and America.¹⁰ According to Ōtani, most of the *Mail* issues purchased by the government went to Europe (a total of 135; most of them, 103, to England, 16 to Germany, 9 to France, and 1–2 to Holland, Belgium, Italy, and Austria), 36 to America, and 9 to China. In Japan, newspapers were sent to individuals and institutions with “significant relationships” with Japan.¹¹ However, while this financial arrangement is one of the main reasons why critics accused Brinkley of a financially motivated “pro-Japanese” stance, things seem to have been more nuanced in terms of his editorial policy. On the one hand, Ōtani emphasizes the fact that, even before being bought by Brinkley in 1881, the *Japan Mail’s* contract with the government was significantly more flexible than the one signed by *Tokio Times*, for example.¹² When Brinkley purchased the *Mail* in 1881 and became its editor-in-chief, he continued to accept the contractual subsidy received by his predecessor. However, he also insisted on keeping his editorial independence and made it clear to the authorities that “the policy of the *Japan Mail* is entirely independent” [original emphasis]. Brinkley was a Japanophile throughout his career, but according to Ōtani, his paper would not have directly reflected the claims of the Japanese government, as the *Tokio Times* had.¹³ The obituary penned by Walter Denning (himself a scholar, member of the Asiatic Society of Japan and long-time contributor to the *Mail*) upon Brinkley’s death seems to suggest that the editor not only kept true to this principle throughout his career, but he also welcomed criticism and enjoyed openly debating his ideas in the pages of his pa-

per: "Captain Brinkley was not the man to shrink from criticism. He threw open the columns of the paper to controversialists of all shades of opinion." To the criticism that he sometimes published articles which only presented interest for a small niche of readers, he responded that "we do not profess to take the taste of the majority of our readers as the sole criterion of what shall and shall not be inserted in this journal." Dening also reminisces about writing a review of Brinkley's *History of Japan* (1903), where he was criticizing the latter for misrepresenting some of his opponents; to this, Brinkley had apparently responded: "Pitch into it at your heart's content. It lies open to attack." Dening continues: "[Brinkley] was always willing to publish attacks on his views by whomsoever written. He often made known to his readers the objections to his assertions that he discovered in Japanese newspapers, for the purpose of showing them how convincingly he could reply to them. This tends to show how strong were his convictions on the subjects to which great prominence was given in the columns of the *Japan Mail*."¹⁴ In the obituary, Dening also addresses the issue of Brinkley's unflinching pro-Japanese stance: "If the paper has often figured as a defender of Japanese points of view against foreign points of view, it was because by long residence in this country and subjection to numerous subtle Japanese influences of various kinds the editor's mind had become pro-Japanese in many things. But careful readers of the *Mail* will not have failed to observe that there were occasions when Captain Brinkley strongly condemned the policy pursued by the government."¹⁵

And still, what are we to make of the *Japan Mail's* financial and personal connection to the government during Brinkley's editorship? Was this situation as controversial as it seems to us today? To explore the issue further, it would be helpful to address it in a

broader context and look at how the Japanese newspaper industry was functioning at the time.

The birth of the “newspaper” in Japan

It is difficult for us today — in a world saturated with information, when the news gets delivered to us instantly, with the click of a mouse — to imagine what it was like for people living in early Meiji Japan to publish or even read a newspaper. In the late 19th century, Japan’s printing culture was undergoing a massive transition, from a xylographic to a typographic model. This simple change in the way of putting text on paper led to a completely new way in which people read, wrote, communicated, and even organized. In the Meiji period, aided by the government’s push for widespread education and language standardization, typographic print led to the quick establishment of a newspaper industry and to “the news” becoming a daily commodity for most people. The idea of a “public” also started to take form: in just a few decades, from the 1850s to the late 1880s, typographically printed news started circulating in the millions,¹⁶ and periodicals started covering increasingly diverse content — from political news to literature and popular culture. By the time Japan went to war with China (1894–5), it was evident that the public’s need for war-related news had become widespread; and newspapers like *Kokumin Shinbun* (1890–1942) and *Yoroku Chōhō* (1892–1940) were steadily building a middle- and working-class readership in Japan.¹⁷

From the 1850s onward, with the spread of typographic printing and the bakufu’s loosening of restrictions on private news channels, the stage was set for the emergence of a non-governmental news industry. The first (news) paper to appear was the *Nagasaki List and Advertiser*, an English two-sheet paper launched in 1861 by Albert

W. Hansard for the foreign merchants residing in Japan. After moving to Yokohama, Hansard changed the name of the paper to *The Japan Herald* and hired John Reddie Black as an editor.¹⁸ Soon after, other foreign-language newspapers and periodicals mushroomed,¹⁹ although only a few of them survived. Among these, O'Connor notes, the *Japan Mail* was "among the best managed and most professionally written," alongside E.H. House's *Tokio Times* and the *Japan Times* (founded in 1897), all of which were subsidized by the Japanese government.²⁰ At the outset of the 1890s, the *Japan Mail* was also the only newspaper in Japan to have a contract with Reuters, the news agency with a monopoly on news distribution in Asia, and most mainstream Japanese papers would translate news from there.²¹ By 1918, there were also two independent, foreign-owned newspapers, the *Japan Advertiser* (1891) and Robert Young's *Japan Chronicle*, and six English-language business newspapers in Yokohama, Nagasaki, Kōbe, and Tōkyō.

It is no surprise that the first "proper" newspapers in Japan were owned and edited by foreigners. The British arriving in Japan towards the end of the 19th century were bringing with them a long periodical culture. The first English newspaper, Nathaniel Butter's *Weekly News*, had appeared in 1622. The following century saw the spread of the journalistic industry, with newspapers such as the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Morning Herald*, and the *Times* being founded within the span of two decades, between 1770 and 1788. Seeing this type of activity in the port towns inspired several Japanese to consider a career in journalism, and several Japanese-language newspapers were founded in the 1860s. However, not many of these survived, and, at the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, it was still foreign newspapers which spread the news of the bakufu's fall, as they were the only ones published for the benefit of pri-

vate citizens.

From very early on, the Meiji government saw newspapers as an essential medium to educate the public and build a carefully constructed sense of nationhood. So, in the 1870s, it started to actively support the development of the newspaper industry, not only through education and language reform, but also by more direct measures, such as financing the establishment of newspapers, buying copies and distributing them to all the local authorities in the country, and giving special postal rates; this measure, in particular, meant that people in the provinces could now read newspapers, too.²² This kind of help was essential for newly founded papers which struggled to survive, and it seems like all papers cultivated official contacts, in one form or another. For most, being under the state's patronage was a matter of prestige and influence, a sign that they were accurate and dependable; therefore, they strove to maintain this relationship.²³

But government support was a double-edged sword, and this became evident from the mid-1870s onwards, when, following public restlessness and the appearance of critical articles in many newspapers, the government started issuing increasingly repressive ordinances to regulate the publication industry,²⁴ severely affecting the press' freedom of expression: mainstream newspapers could no longer be owned by foreign citizens (this was a measure taken especially against J.R. Black's *Nisshin Shinjishi*); each issue had to carry the names of the editor and the printer, and the editor or owner of the newspaper would be held legally responsible for the printed content. This was a particularly insidious measure: following the issuing of the Libel Law, any article or opinion that could 'injure' the honor of a politician of the emperor was cause for legal punishment — fines, the suspension of publication, or even arrest.²⁵ Eng-

lish-language newspapers were also targeted by the Press Laws of the 1880s, as the Meiji government had also embarked on a project to “correct” the West’s perception of Japan.

The legislation to limit press freedom issued between 1873–1887 is often mentioned in criticism against Brinkley and his relationship with the Meiji government. During this period, it seems like the *Japan Mail* suffered minimal repercussions. Judging by Ōtani’s account, it seems like Brinkley’s newspaper — although published in English — was perceived in Japan, by officials, as well as other Japanese newspapers, as being “local” and as having a different quality than the “Yokohama newspapers,” which were exclusively tailored to the interests of its foreign residents. This must be another important reason why Brinkley’s reputation as a mouthpiece for the Meiji government took root among his fellow foreign journalists residing in Japan.

From where we stand today, newspaper censorship is a serious violation of democratic principles. However, the context of the Meiji period was significantly different, as Kasza explains: even considering the above restrictive press regulations, early Meiji policy represented a “considerable liberalization of prior practices,” given that Japan “had no antecedents for an autonomous periodical press voicing critical political commentary” — there were 674 periodicals operating in Japan in 1889, out of which 164 were “treating current events.” Kasza suggests that this was a significantly liberal attitude of the Meiji government, which could have easily formulated its press policies on more restrictive models seen in other young modern states created in the 19th century, monopolizing the press and banning private newspaper ownership altogether.²⁶ This is a context that all of Brinkley’s critics, contemporary or later, seem to avoid addressing. But Brinkley must have been aware of it and the

fine balancing act that the Meiji government was performing, which is probably why he also did not have such difficulties in marrying his lifelong allyship of Japan with his journalistic career.

“Correcting foreign perceptions”

One argument brought against Brinkley’s relevance is his “pro-Japanese” stance, which he put forth not only in the pages of his newspaper but also in the pages of *The Times* of London, whose correspondent he was for a long time.²⁷ This was interpreted as a lack of journalistic integrity and clear proof of his nefarious relationship with the Meiji government,²⁸ which offered financial support for English-language newspapers which would help “correct foreign perceptions” about Japan. As O’Connor showed, the *Japan Mail* and *The Times* were among the most important English-language newspapers in Japan and abroad to present Japan with more empathy, introducing it as a valued ally to the West. But what was behind the Meiji government’s attempt to “correct foreign perceptions” about Japan?

The government’s policy did not appear out of thin air. Many of the so-called “treaty port newspapers” were among the government’s harshest critics, and consistently vented their criticism of Japan and its people. This is not necessarily surprising, as these were papers which catered only to the local foreign community, an audience which was in many ways disconnected from “deeper” Japan and steadfast in its refusal to undertake any effort to understand it. This was a fact decried not only by the government or the likes of Brinkley but also by other scholars and journalists. This is what Stafford Ransome, the special correspondent of the *Morning Post* in the Far East, writes in 1899 almost half a century after the opening of the treaty port at Yokohama:

"In order to understand the [ir] position, let us try and imagine that there is established in England a treaty-port [...]; and that in pursuit of their business a highly respectable class of Japanese tradesmen have established themselves there; that they have built their own houses, live their own lives, wear their own clothes, are under their own jurisdiction, and do not bother to learn our language (for the treaty-port foreigner in Japan, with very rare exceptions, never troubles to learn Japanese). *Let us further assume that this imaginary Japanese community in England are in the habit of publishing daily newspapers violently denouncing everything that is British, simply because the methods of the English dock-laborers, cabmen, interpreters, and runners, who hang around their settlement for the purpose of getting what they can out of the residents, are not particularly scrupulous or high-minded. We should say at once that the criticism was unfair,* and that the Japanese at Wapping were not in a position to form an accurate estimate of England and the English; *that they were basing their opinions of the former on a place which, by reason of its being outside British jurisdiction, was really not England at all (...)* If we transpose this picture, we shall find that (...) on account of all these conditions that the treaty-port estimate of Japanese character and methods is misleading."²⁹ [italics mine]

Ransome not only decries the unwillingness of port residents to see beyond their isolated communities but also the "orientalizing gaze" of the temporary foreign visitor to Japan, which was perpetuating a misleading account of the place's character and culture:

"he who endeavors to <Japonify> [...] himself at short notice, and without being able to speak the language. He becomes enamoured of the country, and possibly of some one in it, and is rapturously maudlin in telling us all about it. To such a man Japan is peopled with dear little giggling dolls, living in dear little miniature houses made of <card-board.> He eats fairy food out of miniature dishes; [...] He laughs in innocent glee at it all, as he lets the rice fall from his chopsticks on to the spotless tatami, for he is in such a delightful little shallow-minded, light-hearted immoral paradise. He hugs himself in the belief that he is living among laughing children again, and he has no thought for the morrow; for he has not grasped the fact that his companions are bored with it all, but that etiquette and business exigencies oblige them to appear amused at his eccentricities; he does not understand that, if their laugh is genuine, they are laughing at him rather than with him, and that it is he in reality who is the child. [...] The above enthusiastic individual, who has solved the Japanese problem to his own satisfaction, will tell that he has <eaten the lotus,> when, in plain English, he has merely become very silly. Such silliness, however, is infectious, and his graphic recital of what he terms his 'Adventures in the land of the Rising Sun' has often had the effect of causing others to visit Japan with the express purpose of endeavoring to emulate him."³⁰

It is not, then, so hard to comprehend the Meiji government's exasperation at the way Japan continued to be perceived in countries they were looking to forge long-term relationships with, be they cultural, economic, or political. Of course, this does not excuse the Japanese government's increasingly restrictive policies on the newspaper industry at the turn of the century, but it also provides much-needed context to its attempt to forge lucrative relationships with English-language newspapers.

In terms of Japan's perception among Westerners, the situation was not much different abroad. Accounts about the racist attitudes towards Japanese citizens traveling abroad abound around the turn of the century. Japanese intellectuals going abroad to study frequently came back disillusioned with the extent of racism encountered, and Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 — which made the diplomatic world pay attention — hardly changed the situation at the grassroots. In his preface to *Japan and the Japanese as Seen by Foreigners Prior to the Beginning of the Russo-Japanese War*, a collection of essays written by some of the most prominent foreign writers on all things Japanese at the time, Kawakami says:

“He who has been delighted with the charming compliments expressed by the writers represented in this book is more than likely to feel that he was gravely deceived by those authors *when he goes abroad and becomes acquainted with the disagreeable, almost hostile, attitude of ordinary people towards him and his country. The moment he lands at a foreign port especially at such places on the Pacific coast of America as Seattle and San Francisco, he will be welcomed by the vilest sort of epithets. The wild ‘kid’ will call him ‘John Chinaman,’ the street loafer will whisper in his ears such indecent names as will make him blush with mingled feelings of anger and shame, and the press will print in big staring letters such slipsbod vulgarisms as ‘Jap,’ ‘little brown man,’ and the like. He will find all these and hundreds of other disagreeable things in countries where he expected to meet the most flattering and delightful compliments.* To a reader such as he I must explain that those foreigners who have studied and endeavoured to understand Japan form a mere fraction as compared with the great mass among which prevails dense ignorance regarding things Japanese. The favorable sentiment expressed in most of the articles contained in this book is that of the learned class of foreigners.”³¹

[italics mine]

In this context, Brinkley's case stands out. This is not to say that the *Japan Mail* never published opinions contrary to the Meiji government's interests. But indeed, the editor's stance throughout his journalistic career is steadfastly pro-Japanese, in that he never gave up the "empathetic eye" for the Japanese side of every diplomatic or cultural matter. As the editor of the *Times* says in his obituary, Brinkley made Japan his home and never regretted it, and this is evident throughout his journalistic and scholarly activity. As I also showed in a previous analysis,³² Brinkley's dedication to correcting stereotypical images of Japan and its culture was a constant throughout his journalistic career, and the background described above would have been an essential motivator for him. He was not uncritical with regard to his new home. But compared to many other British journalists and scholars of the epoch, like B.H. Chamberlain, whose stance of all things Japanese never put aside a certain colonial mentality, Brinkley's analyses — although fair and factual — are consistently non-Eurocentric and empathetic to the Japanese and their wobbly walk into modernity, grounded in his belief that his European peers tend to unfairly look down on the Japanese:

"Strangers discussing the character of the Japanese have assigned to it an extraordinary element of patriotism, and inferred abnormal readiness to make sacrifices on the altar of love of country. There is no warrant for such a theory. [...] What is mistaken for an unusual abundance of the sentiment is simply its morbid activity, caused by, on the one hand, by a genuine perception of the distance they have to traverse before they reach the elevation of prosperity and progress on which Occidental nations stand; on the other, by the treatment they have received at the hands of those nations. The most tolerant of Europeans has always regarded the Japanese, and let them see that he regarded them, merely as interesting children. Languidly curious at best, [...] his curiosity was purely academic, and whenever circumstances required him to be practical, he laid aside all pretense of courtesy and let it be plainly seen that he counted himself master and in-

tended to be so counted. [...] And in that respect they reflect the demeanour of the ordinary foreigner. When not a harsh critic, he was either contemptuously tolerant or loftily patronizing. [...] The Japanese chafed under that kind of treatment, and they resent it still.”³³

In an article he pens for *The Times* in 1904, he again shows his annoyance at the bigotry underlying the unwarranted disbelief that some were showing in Japan’s capabilities to deal with a long-term war as based *on national features*:

“To those who have lived long in Japan and had sufficient opportunities of associating with the Japanese people, the experiences of the present war were not necessary as guides to the nation’s character. *Nor, indeed, is there any logical defensible reason for assigning to an Oriental race moral endowments inferior to or greatly differing from the endowments of Western peoples, unless it can be demonstrated that special circumstances have been operative in either case* [...] The Japanese, in spite of the keen interest their remarkable exploits have attracted, are not seriously studied by the public at large, their successes being resented by some and attributed by others less to their own deserts than to the deficiencies of their adversaries. *The truth is that the reluctance widely felt by Occidentals to concede equal titles of respect to any oriental race is characteristic of a state of mind which not only prefers comfortable ignorance to startling enlightenment, but, even when partially informed, finds solace in reservations not yet plainly inconsistent with facts.*”³⁴ [italics mine]

His journalistic activity thoroughly represents Brinkley as a Japanophile and a British government critic, but his seems more of an ideologically motivated connection to the government, and not a financially motivated one. In a world saturated with Euro-centric stances on Japanese issues (in scholarly and journalistic circles), Brinkley seems to have taken upon himself the task of putting forth a more empathetic view of Japan’s modern transformation. As W. E. Griffis, another well-known Western scholar of the period, also notes: “Captain Brinkley makes merry over this ‘diapason of dignified condescension.’ Over and over again this Englishman of judicial mind handles, with searching criticism and often with frank disapproval, the methods of British diplomacy, while praising

the policy of the United States government, which 'may be implicitly trusted to do in any international complication, not merely what is right and just but also what is generous.'"³⁵

Aside from a financial arrangement that seems rather common in the era, as seen previously, the rest of the available information on the issue makes it difficult to draw a clearcut conclusion on whether Brinkley was a simple opportunist or if he was an honest advocate of Japan's interests abroad. And for this, more analysis is required, beyond chatter from rival editors that his "consistently pro-Japanese line deep suspicions among his contemporaries that Brinkley was in government pay."³⁶

(II) *Brinkley and early English Japanology in the Meiji period*

Another issue that needs to be addressed in this context of Brinkley's often-criticized Japanophilia is the *source* of many such criticisms, mainly some of his prominent contemporaries, such as the scholar B.H. Chamberlain or Robert Young, the editor of the *Japan Chronicle*. While their criticism cannot be simply discarded, their evaluations also pose some serious problems if viewed in the broader context of Meiji-period diplomatic relationships with Britain and the way these shaped the story of English-language Japanology at the time. Below I will explore some evaluations made of Brinkley and his work by B.H. Chamberlain and Sir Ernest Satow, in an attempt to shed further light on the way the relationship between these three Japanologists mirrored the broader geopolitical context.

It is not surprising that in more recent evaluations of Brinkley's work, such as Hoare's, judgements made by someone of Chamberlain's stature would be given so much weight. Together with Satow and W.G. Aston, Chamberlain is among the monumental figures of

early British (and Western) Japanology. The three were among the most active members of the Asiatic Society of Japan. Satow, then Japanese Secretary at the British Legation, was a founding member of the Asiatic Society of Japan in 1872, while Chamberlain and Aston were among the Society's most respected members throughout the Meiji period. Aston was also a British diplomat, initially a student interpreter with Satow (1864), later Assistant Japanese secretary to the Legation 1875–1880, and Consul at Kōbe until his transfer to Korea in 1883. He was, alongside Satow, the main historian of the Society. Chamberlain was active within the Society starting from 1877, four years after his arrival in Japan, and regularly contributed papers on grammar, translations, the Ainu, and literature (including a widely acclaimed translation of *Kojiki*, published in the Society's *Transactions* in 1881). In 1886, he was appointed Professor of Japanese at the Imperial University and Advisor to the Ministry of Education on the systematic teaching of Japanese. All three intellectuals kept a very close scholarly and personal relationship throughout their stay in Japan, as correspondence and mutually appreciative reviews show it.³⁷

As I stressed above, their criticism of Brinkley's work cannot — and should not — be completely dismissed, as it was based on some undeniable facts. As Hoare and more recent critics have pointed out, the editor's connection with the Meiji government was not uncontroversial. The *Japan Mail* was one of the most important English-language sources to publicize government policies in foreign communities, at home and abroad, and the fact that the Press Laws of the late 19th century left his paper pretty much unscathed suggests at least a partial acquiescence with the government. There are also some issues with his scholarship, which was not always beyond criticism. One example comes from Asakawa's

1916 review of Brinkley's posthumous *A History of the Japanese People from the Earliest Times to the End of the Meiji Era*: here, the reviewer criticizes the quality of Brinkley's work in its historical aspects, noting that the author had been unusually careless in his selection of sources or that he had neglected "some of the well-established facts, the knowledge of which would have materially influenced many of his statements." However, Asakawa notes further that Brinkley's work, "such as it is, is based upon a greater amount of literature [...] than any other of the same kind except Murdoch's" and that his "failure as a historian is counterbalanced by his large powers as a chronicler and historical connoisseur." Overall, for the reviewer, although Brinkley's book does not supersede Murdoch's as a history, "stands as a chronicle embodying the traditional view of men and things, unequalled by any other work in a European language. So it is likely to remain, for it will be a long time before we may see other annals of Japan written with equal literary charm [...]." ³⁸

However, as I argued earlier, Brinkley's story as a journalist and scholar needs to be more nuanced and move beyond this persistent label that has been attached to his name, that of an uncritical, "pro-Japanese," mediocre scholar. As I showed in the previous part of the paper, his empathetic stance on all things Japanese was more a matter of principle and not the result of an unctuous relationship with the government, as his sympathy for the Japanese is clear in all aspects of his life, journalism, and scholarly work. ³⁹

As far as his scholarly reputation is concerned, I argue that it is equally connected to the geopolitical context in which he was active. Although Brinkley seems to have been highly valued by his fellow scholars Chamberlain and Satow in the early days of their activity in Japan, the tone of their evaluation changes abruptly on the

background of the Anglo–Japanese treaty revision negotiations. From sending Brinkley his “love” in some of his early letters to G.W. Aston, Satow’s feelings towards Brinkley turn into complete mistrust after the latter’s death. Chamberlain’s evaluation of Brinkley’s work changes along the same lines: although having made extensive use of Brinkley’s work in the first editions of his famous *Things Japanese* and in his early linguistic studies,⁴⁰ Chamberlain’s later impressions of Brinkley change completely; he even goes as far as to remove Brinkley’s books from the list of recommended readings in later editions of *Things Japanese*. As I will show below, the timeline of this shift in Satow and Chamberlain’s evaluations of Brinkley coincides with the diplomatic issues arising between Britain and Japan around the turn of the 20th century, when the scholarly waters split over the revision of the Anglo–Japanese treaty, between the “pro–Japanese” Brinkley and the “British patriots” like Chamberlain and Satow.

The tendency to exoticize Japan — in one direction or another — did not preclude the foreign intellectuals who made Japan their main object of study around the turn of the 20th century, as Kawakami’s *Preface* to his 1904 volume shows: in both the negative and the more eulogistic accounts he compiled, the editor noticed that this generalized appetite for exoticization stemmed from a crass misunderstanding and an inherent lack of respect for the Japanese, who were more often than not “exploited for those old, quaint, and beautiful <things Japanese>”: even “in agreeable compliments of foreign writers on Japan there lurks some thought which is not after all pleasing to us. [...] To be brief, Japan is or at least has been, in the eye of most of her admirers, like an innocent sweet damsel to be petted and played with, and not like a strong man commanding the respect of all who come in contact with

him.”⁴¹ In the end, for many writers coming from hegemonic European nations like Britain, Japan was nothing more than a land to be “civilized,” as was the case with leading figures like B.H. Chamberlain and Sir Ernest Satow. Following the 1894 revision of the “unequal treaties,” Chamberlain writes the following in an addendum to the article “Treaties with Foreign Powers” in *Things Japanese*:

“[...] the impossible has come to pass. [...] Hereby, either explicitly or else implicitly by the recognition of her legal codes (some of which had not even been published at that date!), Japan obtained the abolition of extraterritoriality, full jurisdiction over British subjects, the right to fix her own import dues, the monopoly of the coasting trade, and the exclusion of British subjects from the purchase of land, or even from the leasing of land for agricultural or mining purposes. In exchange, Great Britain obtained — ? The only items revealed by a microscopic scrutiny are that every one will be permitted to travel unmolested in the interior, — but in practice this privilege was enjoyed already, as would naturally be the case in any country ranking as civilized, — and that property may be leased in the interior for residential and commercial purposes. [...] From the point of view of a patriotic Japanese, the Japanese negotiators, from 1873 down to the present day, deserve the warmest encomiums; [...] From the point of view of patriotic Englishmen, the residents in Japan (that is, the class which possesses the best knowledge of the state of the case) almost unanimously regard the British Foreign Office with contempt [...]”⁴².

Chamberlain’s criticism of the outcome of the treaty revision — which, in the addendum, is mainly aimed at the British Foreign Office’s negotiation skills — sounds a lot more like bigotry in his private correspondence, where his resentment towards Brinkley also becomes apparent. In a letter he sent to his friend, Lafcadio Hearn, the same year, he writes:

“Besides this, we are deprived of liberty of the press and of public meeting — no more newspapers, if you please, except the ‘Japan Mail.’ And to crown the edifice, a great power like England has been induced by Aoki’s wiles and the ineptitude of her own diplomats to leave it entirely at Japan’s option when (and if) to put the treaty into force, so that whereas our merchants remain absolutely in the dark and know not what arrangements to make, the Japanese may seize any moment that appears to them most favour-

able to themselves and least to us. [...] *and as for crowds of Englishmen trooping into the country, as some Japanese fondly expect, it is rubbish, seeing they have so many nearer and richer places to go, where property is safer from caprice, and white men's lives and doings are not at the mercy of Oriental officials plus a Western veneer.*"⁴³ [italics mine].

After the Triple Intervention of April 1894, forcing Japan to recede the Liaodong Peninsula despite its victory in the Sino-Japanese war, resentment towards the unequal treaties — fueled by nationalistic fervor — started gaining momentum in Japan, and the issue split British scholars of Japan into “pro-Japanese” like Brinkley and “patriotic Englishmen,” who saw their “white men’s lives and doings” threatened. British scholars of Japan held in extremely high respect — in Japan and abroad — became increasingly uncertain of Japan’s capacity to carry out its project of being a world power and became increasingly vitriolic in their (private) opinions about the Japanese. To give only two examples, here is a letter written by Chamberlain to Hearn in 1891:

“More interesting still is the question as to the *intellectual and emotional worth of the Japanese*. I have myself gone through many phases of opinion, but the net result is that they appear to me far inferior to the European race, — *at once less profound, less tender, and less imaginative.* [italics mine] Much of what strikes one as originality at first is only, so to say, a relative originality as compared to Europe; after a time one finds out either that the thing, whatever it may be, was borrowed from China, or else perhaps that, though superficially pretty, it is not really worth so much as the corresponding thing in the West. Take poetry, for instance. [...] I read practically all, from the Manyōshū downwards, and I now see that all of it together hardly contains so much imaginative power as half-a-dozen of Wordsworth’s sonnets. There is a dryness, a jejuneness in all Japanese thought. All this is very sad to write, *and I would not write it publicly* [emphasis in the original], for the reason that many would ascribe the adverse judgement to other motives than dispassionate comparison.”⁴⁴

And a private letter sent by Satow to F.V. Dickins in 1895:

“The question remains, is the Japanese nation able to carry out the whole of the magnificent programme, is there a sufficient stock of physical strength in reserve to meet the huge demands that will be made upon it. Or are they like the Portuguese of the Early

Discovery period, who undertook a gigantic enterprise under the special stimulus imparted to them by one man, and having met with one great disaster [...] fell at once into nothingness in which they have for ever after remained. *During my residence in Japan I never had the belief that Japan would get beyond a third or fourth rate position; the people seemed to be too much mere imitators, and wanting in bottom.* [except for the chivalrous courage of the samurai class] [...]. To beat the Chinese is easy, it is like cutting through a mouldy cheese; any one could do that. Neat organization is another thing one credited the Japanese with; they have patience and the bureaucratic spirit. [...] But do not people like Brinkley and other newspaper correspondents take them a little too seriously? That is the question I want answered. And if the Russians object to the cession of Manchuria and the perpetual supremacy of the Japanese in Corea [...] what will be the result? I cannot imagine our taking side in such a quarrel. After all Russians are Europeans, and au fond have the same ideals as ourselves, so why should we in such a case espouse the Japanese cause?"⁴⁵ [italics mine]

Satow, a close friend of Chamberlain's, seems to share the latter's distrust of the Japanese and their capacity to handle their new-found status on the international stage.

Against this background, perhaps it is not so difficult to understand the shift in Chamberlain's evaluation of Brinkley as being an authoritative voice on Japanese art and political history in 1890⁴⁶ to his becoming "far too Japanese"⁴⁷ only a few years later, in 1894, and an "ever-present warning of what might happen to such as remain stuck forever in one rut" (in 1906).⁴⁸

Satow's evaluation of Brinkley also seems to have shifted along the same lines and timeline as Chamberlain's. The letters he writes to Aston between 1874 and 1882 show Satow in close contact with Brinkley: once, he sends Aston an enclosed package (or letter) for Brinkley,⁴⁹ a few other times he sends him his "love,"⁵⁰ and mentions collaborating with him in various scholarly endeavors.⁵¹ As of 1889, on the background of the treaty revision "spectacle" (in letters addressed to Dickins), there is a clear change in tone, suggesting Satow's annoyance at Brinkley's advocacy for the Japanese government:

“The [Treaty Revision] negotiations with Japan present a curious spectacle. Here you have the Americans, Germans and Russians going in for the abolition of extraterritoriality, before the codes are completed, and in the face of hostile comments on the drafts of those codes by Japanese lawyers, England I imagine about to follow suit at the leading of Brinkley. [H.S.] Palmer and the “Times”. I hear from Japan that the native press is beginning to sound the alarm, because it dreads the admission of Europeans into the interior on equal terms. Brinkley says as little about this reaction as possible, but he cannot entirely ignore it. He is Inouye Kaoru in an English dress, not Japan. I am out of the swim completely, but I feel pretty sure that our best policy is to be consistent, and to continue to say “Show us first your codes”. We have been saying that for the past twenty years, and it is weak to abandon that principle because Herbert Bismarck has played us false. But I am afraid you don’t agree with me, if it is the case that you have written a letter to the papers urging the conclusion of a Treaty on the Ōkuma [Shigenobu] lines.”⁵²

and by 1894, he criticizes Brinkley as being “far too pro-Japanese,” quoting Chamberlain:

“You asked me to give you my opinion about a “Times” correspondent for Japan. [...] [John] Milne is the best man. [...] You may have heard that Brinkley contemplates giving up the “Mail” and going in for the curio business with a New York dealer named Deakin. That is what I hear from Chamberlain. Brinkley is far too pro-Japanese.”⁵³

The fact that this change in attitude is directly connected to Brinkley’s stance on the treaties and his criticism of British policy is evident if one notices Satow’s letters on the development of the war: shifting from complete lack of confidence in Japan’s military/organizational prowess (and mistrust of such “far too pro-Japanese” Britons such as Brinkley) to disbelief in the face of Japan’s victory at Port Arthur.⁵⁴ In 1912, his last penned words on Brinkley upon his passing are, “I have not seen any fuller memoir of Brinkley than what appeared in the “Times”. *As you perhaps know I did not trust him. Who wrote the “Times” notice I cannot imagine. As you say, it was the work of an ignorant person.*”⁵⁵

The shift in Satow’s attitude is also not surprising, as he and Chamberlain had a much closer relationship with each other than

with Brinkley, as the correspondence between Aston and Dickins reveals: throughout the period covered by Ruxton and Kornicki's 2008 volume, Satow seems to be constantly in touch with Chamberlain and aware of his minute opinions, as well as ailments; in terms of numbers, Chamberlain's name is mentioned some 90 times, whereas Brinkley's appears in 20–25 instances.⁵⁶ In his work, too, Chamberlain often leans on Satow's work, especially on harsher judgements on Japanese art, politics, or character. To give only two examples: in his entry on Japanese literature, where he dismisses *Genji Monogatari*'s value as a literary work, he says:

"Sir Ernest Satow's judgement of the *Genji Monogatari* agrees with ours. <The plot,> writes he, <is devoid of interest, and it is only of value as marking a stage in the development of the language.> Fairness, however, required that the very different estimate of their work formed by Mr. Aston, the accomplished historian of Japanese literature, should be here cited."⁵⁷

In the entry *Bushidō*, he notes that:

"As for bushidō, so modern a thing is it that neither Kaempfer, Siebold, Satow, nor Rein – all men knowing their Japan by heart – ever once allude to it in their voluminous writings. The cause of their silence is not far to seek: Bushidō was unknown until thirty years ago. The very word appears in no dictionary, native or foreign, before the year 1900."⁵⁸

Furthermore, the diplomatic relations between Britain and Japan were going through a significantly difficult period. According to O'Connor, British policy in East Asia around the turn of the century was profoundly ambivalent because of a "double-sided" image of Japan, which was influenced by "racial assumptions about the ability of non-white nations to confront the modern Western states." The two images of Japan available to the Western imaginary at the time fluctuated between a nation bent on regional domination and a "backward power that lacked the resources necessary to achieve

its goals.”⁵⁹ This attitude seems consistent with Satow and Chamberlain’s introduced above. British intellectuals active in Japan at the time, as O’Connor notes, were “inevitably drawn within the geopolitical parameters of the day.”⁶⁰ Chamberlain and Satow naturally gravitated towards their mother country, diplomatically and ideologically, while Brinkley drew closer to his adoptive country.

Judging from Chamberlain’s change of tone in his public evaluation of Brinkley’s work and the examples drawn from Satow’s correspondence, the relationship between Brinkley and the two Japanologists seems to be breaking over the issue of the Anglo-Japanese treaty revision, which revealed two “factions:” the “pro-Japanese,” who sided with the Meiji government’s project to “correct Japan’s image” among foreigners, and the “British patriots,” whose bigotry became less veiled once Japan raised from its “British disciple” role to demand equal treatment on the international stage. In both Satow’s and Chamberlain’s evaluation of Brinkley’s scholarly and personal value, this seems to be the most important turning point.

On this geopolitical background, the distance between Brinkley and the two aforementioned scholars might have also been imposed by Brinkley, who was equally critical of the increasingly critical voices of the British scholars towards Japan. Despite being a founding member of the Asiatic Society of Japan and his prolific research on Japanese history, art, language, and current affairs, his work is conspicuously missing from the volumes of the Society. Although Brinkley kept Satow and Chamberlain in high regard throughout his life (e.g., the 1903 volume of *Japan: Its History Arts and Literature* is dedicated to Satow, Aston, and Chamberlain) and consistently reported on their scholarly activity in the columns of his newspaper, he chose to never publish his work in the *Transactions* of the

Society and generally kept a safe distance from them, presumably on account of the drift forming in the British community residing in and studying Japan.

As mentioned earlier, another of Brinkley's prominent detractors was Robert Young, the editor of *Japan Chronicle*, and his resentment towards Brinkley seems to have emerged against the same background as Chamberlain's and Satow's. O'Connor describes Young as having a rather "feisty reputation in Japan," mainly on account of these very clashes with Brinkley and the *Mail* over the editor's friendship with members of the oligarchy and the government's financial support for the newspaper. Apparently, Young was consistently and increasingly at odds with Japan's Foreign Ministry, and he often tended to exaggerate his rivalries, as his obituary seems to suggest: "occasionally the amount of artillery, which he employed, gave the impression that his opponent was more formidable than was really the case." Accounts of Young's paper (as was the case with Brinkley's *Mail*, but in the opposite direction) ranged from being appreciated as a "truthful reporter of Japanese life" to being deprecated as "an unforgivably anti-Japanese paper that pandered to expatriate prejudices and stained the image of Japan around the world." In this matrix of a highly polarized British press in Japan, Brinkley, probably with full awareness, positioned himself at the opposite pole, that of an unabashed ally of the Japanese, striving throughout his life to correct bigoted representations of the country he had made his home.

The fact that so many of Brinkley's critics fell within this paradigm is an aspect that too often goes unmentioned. If Brinkley is to be summarily labeled as "pro-Japanese," his critics overwhelmingly fall on the side of an "anti-Japanese" stance in the geopolitical context of the period, so their criticism needs to be contextual-

ized in a much larger perspective, which includes the complexities of that first extended contact between Japan and the Western world around the turn of the 20th century, and the issues that affected the people residing in Japan, both Japanese and foreign.

Again, O'Connor's analysis could shed some light on why Brinkley's name slipped through the cracks in the field of English-language (British) Japanology: as a result of Japan's rising as a power in East-Asia, there was also a conspicuous shift in the type of writings on Japan that became popular in the West, from texts written by Japanese (or empathetic views on Japanese matters, such as Brinkley's, we might assume) to more critical accounts: "the tendency of Western critics to praise or view as authentic or authoritative the work of Japanese writers publishing in English may have diminished as authenticity was increasingly attributed to the work of critical, even anti-Japanese, writings by journalists and Western scholars based in Japan." Japanese (and probably more empathetic accounts on Japanese matters, such as Brinkley's) "may have been seen as possessing less authority to comment on events in their homeland than critical Western writers who shared the assumptions and background of their readers."⁶¹ This might be, as Hoare also suggests, when Brinkley's name completely lost its value in the field of British Japanology: following the souring relationship between Japan and Britain in the 1920s, Brinkley's name came to be remembered with disdain, at best.

Concluding thoughts

As previously noted, it is not surprising that recent scholarship on Brinkley would give so much weight to evaluations made by giants in the field of (British) early Japanology, such as Chamberlain and Satow. However, as I hopefully managed to show here, the con-

text of their evaluation tells a much broader and more complex story, one that not only sheds light on the issue at hand — the re-evaluation of Brinkley’s activity as a Japanologist and his curious slip into quasi-obscurity — , but also speaks of the complex changes that Japan was undergoing in the 19th and 20th centuries, and how these influenced the evolution of early English-language Japanology. Brinkley’s is a story intricately connected to Japan’s modern destiny, with all the light and darkness that lurk within it. And it is also a story that, in many ways, speaks of how deeply our biases and human weakness have been influencing our work as cultural historians, then and now. There are no complete innocents and no complete monsters in the above story, just people whose personal and professional destinies were inevitably shaped by the forces of history and proof that no historian can escape the insidiousness of their own human weakness. As E.H. Carr beautifully put it, “when you read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing. If you can detect none, either you are tone deaf, or your historian is a dull dog. [...] By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts he wants. History means interpretation.”⁶² Neither Chamberlain and Satow nor Brinkley were dull dogs by any stretch of the imagination.

¹ This study is based on primary sources available at the *Kanda Sano Repository* and has been realized with the support of the *Center for Japanese Studies* at *Kanda University of International Studies*.

² In a letter to the *Times* (where he corrects a factual error appearing in Brinkley’s obituary), Lord Redesdale writes: “it was undoubtedly Captain Brinkley who raised the [English] Press [in Japan] to the position which it now holds, and the influence which he wielded was enormous.” (*The Times*, October 30, 1912, p. 7). Another article in *The Times* in 1910 notes: “The Press is well represented in Yokohama as there are two Japanese papers and four foreign daily papers, of which the *Japan Mail*, ably conducted by Captain Brinkley, is the best known.” (*The Times*, July 19, 1910, p. 59)

³ See, for example, Hoare 1999, Nagamori 2020, or Mustatea 2021.

⁴ Hoare 1999, p. 106–107.

⁵ Cited in Hoare 1999, p. 106.

⁶ Id.

⁷ See, for example, O'Connor 2009's analysis of news networks in East-Asia, which includes a detailed account of *Japan Mail's* role.

⁸ Rotard 2021, p. 5. However, Rotard's analysis does not go into detail regarding Brinkley's activity, as his article focuses on Zumoto Motosada (co-founder of *The Japan Times*, alongside Yamada Sueji) and his financial and ideological connections with the Meiji government, as well as to Fukuzawa Yukichi and various government-affiliated zaibatsu and newspapers. As such, he bases the most part of his criticism of Brinkley almost entirely on Hoare 1999, which explains the similar line of argumentation: "Brinkley's articles were consistently pro-Japanese. It indiscriminately championed all Japanese Government politics, arguing favourably for Japanese military and naval expansion as well as supporting policies towards Korea and China, even going so far as dismissing reports in other English-language papers of Japanese atrocities in Korea as 'iniquitous falsehoods' drummed up by 'the hostile orchestra' of *The Japan Herald*, *Japan Gazette* and *Kobe Chronicle*. The *Japan Mail's* consistently pro-Japanese line raised deep suspicions among his contemporaries that Brinkley was in government pay. Robert Young, a Japanese Government critic and founder of the *Kobe Chronicle* regularly decried Brinkley's constant promotion of Government policy in his columns." Among Brinkley's journalistic rivals identified by Rotard — on the basis of O'Connor 2010 — is also J.H. Brooke (*the Japan Herald*, the first English-language paper in Japan). However, what Rotard does not include in his above analysis — and O'Connor does — is the broader context of this rivalry between Young and Brinkley, as I will show later.

⁹ Rotard 2021, p. 5.

¹⁰ Huffman 1997, p. 417, p. 421 and Rotard 2021, p. 6.

¹¹ Ōtani 1994, p. 64.

¹² According to Ōtani, the first suggestion to launch a government-run English-language newspaper appeared in 1874, in a memorandum addressed to Shigenobu Okuma, director general of the Taiwan Bureau at the time; the memorandum suggested that — given the fact that Japan's modernization depended heavily on foreign capitalists' investment, correct information about Japan needed to be widely spread and trusted. The memorandum made a note of the Yokohama *Gaiji Shinbun's* "anti-Japanese" attitude in an effort to keep the foreign traders of Yokohama happy. To this end, a state-run newspaper, published in English and Japanese, would not only enhance the external credibility of the government but would also allow the control of information and a more efficient promotion of Japanese policies. The proposal was for the establishment of a government press in Tokyo. Buying the *Japan Mail* was one of the options proposed during this process, but that plan never came to fruition. The *Japan Mail* had, as did *Tokio Times*, a contract with the government; however, the conditions were different from the latter. According to the *Tokio Times* 1876 contract, the paper would receive a monthly subsidy of 500 yen from the Japanese government, and an annual mailing charge of 500 yen, for a total of 6500 yen per year. In one of the subsections, the contract stipulated that whenever Toshimichi Okubo or Shigenobu Okuma desired to publish a special account, they would be allowed to write their own articles and have them published as such in the pages of the newspaper. Another subsection stipulated that the paper would always expose true, fair, and impartial facts, *always considering the government's interests*. (Ōtani 1994, p. 63)

¹³ Ōtani 1994, p. 63. On the point of Brinkley's insistence on the newspaper's independence, Ōtani cites one of the editor's letters, dated March 1.

¹⁴ *The Japan Weekly Mail*, Nov. 2, 1912, p. 516.

¹⁵ *Id.* It was not only Dening who addressed Brinkley's legacy as a so-called apologist. On the issue of his pro-Japanese stance being inspired by the Japanese Foreign Office, Fukuzawa Yukichi's *Jiji Shimpō* also notes: "his personality gradually drove off such suspicions, and the public in later years began to recognize that he had no other motive but to explain the condition of Japan to the outside world." (cited in *Id.*, p. 518)

¹⁶ Shockey 2020. According to Huffman, although the circulation of individual papers rose unevenly, the "total national newspaper circulation quintupled from 8.3 million in 1874 to 44.5 million in 1879, with the number of subscriptions for every 10,000 citizens rising from 6.7 to 34.1" (Huffman 1997, p. 87).

¹⁷ For a more detailed account, see Shockey 2020.

¹⁸ Huffman 1997, p. 393. Black later founded his own newspaper, the *Japan Gazette*, in 1867, as well as, later on, in 1872, *Nisshin Shinjishi*, a Japanese-language periodical. In 1875, Black was forced out of his role by the Press Law, which prevented foreigners from editing Japanese-language papers.

¹⁹ According to O'Connor, over forty newspapers and over thirty periodicals. (O'Connor 2009, p. 31)

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ In 1893, it seems that *Jiji Shimpō* and, a few years later, *Asabi* signed their own contracts with Reuter, thus reducing the dependency on the *Mail* for news from abroad.

²² On the development of the newspaper industry in Japan, see Shockey 2020 and Huffman 1997. For a more detailed discussion of newspaper censorship, see Mitchell 1983.

²³ Mitchell 1983, p. 40.

²⁴ For more details, see Kasza 1988.

²⁵ Huffman 1997, p. 391.

²⁶ Kasza 1988, pp. 4–7.

²⁷ For more details, see Hoare 1999.

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ Ransome 1899, "Popular Misconceptions of Japan" p. 3–6, cited in Kawakami 1904, p. 212.

³⁰ *Id.*, in Kawakami 1904, p. 214–215.

³¹ Kawakami 1904, p. ix–x.

³² Mustatea 2021.

³³ Brinkley 1903 (I), p. 14–15.

³⁴ Brinkley, "How the Japanese Face Difficulties," in *The Times*, December 27, 1904, p. 6.

³⁵ Griffis 1903, p. 797.

³⁶ Rotard 2021, p. 6.

³⁷ For more information on their activity within the Society, see Farrington 1976. As for evidence of their close personal relationship, see Hearn's and Satow's correspondence (Koizumi 1936, Satow 2008).

³⁸ Asakawa 1916.

³⁹ Also see Mustatea 2021.

⁴⁰ See Dening's obituary.

⁴¹ Kawakami 1904, p. viii–ix.

⁴² Chamberlain 1985, Appendix p. 31–33.

⁴³ Koizumi 1936.

⁴⁴ Koizumi 1936, p. 157.

⁴⁵ Satow 2008, p. 208.

- ⁴⁶ Chamberlain 1985, p. 66.
⁴⁷ Satow 2008, p. 205–206.
⁴⁸ Letter to Hearn, dated 9 March 1906, in Koizumi 1936.
⁴⁹ Satow 2008, p. 4.
⁵⁰ Id., p. 10, 18–19.
⁵¹ In 1876, for example, Satow mentions his worry over crediting Aston and Brinkley in the *Preface* to his own dictionary because “it seems to be that by naming you and Brinkley I threw part of the responsibility on your shoulders;” (Id., p. 18–19). In another instance, he mentions that he wrote a Preface for Brinkley’s “list of names and the transliteration of the Korean alphabet (Id., p. 77).
⁵² Id., p. 166.
⁵³ Id., p. 205–206.
⁵⁴ Id., p. 208, 232, 237.
⁵⁵ Id., p. 294.
⁵⁶ Satow 2008.
⁵⁷ Chamberlain 1985, p. 85
⁵⁸ Id.
⁵⁹ O’Connor 2009, p 93–94 (citing Best 2022, pp. 3–4).
⁶⁰ Id.
⁶¹ Id., p. 57.
⁶² Carr 2001 (1967), pp. 17–18.

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