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Clause typing and presentationals: Further evidence from participle preposing in English

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Abstract

In the literature on linguistics, much attention has been paid to the notion of “clause type,” a conventional association between a sentence form and an illocutionary force. Research on clause typing has focused on addressing the following two central issues from a cross-linguistic perspective: (i) to what extent clause-typing systems show universals and (ii) how sentential forms may be different or parameterized in realizing a particular type of illocutionary force. For example, *wh*-movement has a long tradition in the generative framework, and many proposals have been made to capture the similarities and differences between languages with *wh*-movement and those with *wh*-in-situ (Cheng 1991). Following this research guideline, Hasegawa (2010) takes an innovative step in exploring the presentational clause type, which subsumesthetic judgment sentences (Kuroda 1972) and presentational sentences such as locative inversion. Extending Hasegawa’s approach to participle preposing in English, this paper aims to provide further empirical evidence for the theoretical treatment of the presentational clause type.

Keywords: clause typing, judgement styles (thetic/categorical judgements), presentational function, participle preposing, split CP hypothesis

1. Introduction

One of the main concerns of generative grammar has long been clause-typing systems in natural language, which establish a conventional association between a sentential form and an illocutionary force. Since the earlier stages of generative grammar, research on clause typing has focused on dealing with at least the following two issues: (i) to what extent clause-typing

systems show universals and (ii) how sentential forms may be different or parameterized in realizing a particular type of illocutionary force. With respect to (i), all languages seem to have declaratives, interrogatives, and exclamatives, whereas none will have a clause type that conventionally makes a threat. Regarding (ii), *wh*-interrogatives may differ in their sentential forms across languages, either with overt *wh*-movement (e.g., English) or with *wh*-in-situ (e.g., Japanese, Chinese). Under the GB theoretical framework, Cheng (1991) provides an influential view on capturing the relevant difference under the following clause-typing hypothesis:¹

- (1) Every clause needs to be typed. In the case of typing a *wh*-question, either a *wh*-particle in C^0 is used or else fronting a *wh*-word to the Spec of C^0 is used, thereby typing a clause C^0 by Spec-head agreement.

(Cheng 1991: 29)

- (2) a. What did you buy?

b. [_{CP} what_j [_C did_i [_{IP} you [_r t_i [_{VP} buy t_j]]]]]

- (3) a. Anata-wa nani-o kai-masi-ta-ka?

you-TOP what-ACC buy-POL-PAST-Q

‘What did you buy?’

b. [_{CP} nani-o_i [_C [_{IP} anata-wa [_r [_{VP} t_i kai-masi] -ta]] -ka]] (LF)

Under the clause-typing hypothesis, the *wh*-interrogative in English satisfies the Spec-head agreement requirement by overt *wh*-movement (2b); the one in Japanese also meets it by covert *wh*-movement at LF (3b), thereby associating the sentential form with the illocutionary force of *wh*-questions.

The clause-typing hypothesis proposed by Cheng (1991) has motivated generative linguists to explore further empirical support cross-linguistically and sophisticate the theory of clause typing. Revising Cheng’s clause-typing hypothesis as in (4), Hasegawa (2010) makes painstaking efforts to unify Japanesethetic judgment (*ga*-marked) sentences (Kuroda 1972) and presentational sentences such as locative inversion in English into the

presentational clause type. According to Hasegawa, the presentational clause type is defined as having a semantic/cognitive function to express a directly perceived actual situation that is about to happen, is happening, or happened before the speaker's eyes.

- (4) Sentence types, or Force, must be morphologically identifiable, which is to be discernible either at a Spec of or at a Head of the C system.

(Hasegawa 2010: 17)

- (5) Neko-ga heya-de nemut-tei-ru. [Thetic Judgment]

Neko-NOM room-at sleep-PROG-PRES

'A cat is sleeping in the room.'

- (6) In the room slept a cat. [Locative Inversion]

The primary purpose of this research is to provide further supportive evidence and arguments for Hasegawa's (2010) theoretical treatment of the presentational clause type with reference to participle preposing (e.g. *Speaking at today's lunch will be our local congressman.* (Emonds 1976: 36)). More precisely, this paper demonstrates that participle preposing with the progressive form syntactically realizes the presentational clause type in Hasegawa's sense.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Hasegawa's (2010) empirical characterization of the presentational clause type and its theoretical analysis. Extending her approach to participle preposing, Section 3 provides empirical arguments for its presentational function. Section 4 discusses some remaining issues. Section 5 presents the conclusions of this study.

2. Clause Typing and Presentationals

2.1. Presentationals as a Clause Type

2.1.1. Thetic judgment sentences as presentationals

This subsection introduces Hasegawa's (2010) empirical characterization

of Japanesethetic judgment sentences. According to Kuroda (1965, 1972, 1992), the distinction betweenthetic and judgment sentences is linguistically marked in Japanese by the use of different types of case markers, the topic marker *wa*, and the nominative case marker *ga*. Kuroda argues that the English sentence in (7) can be translated into two sentences in Japanese, a *ga* sentence and a *wa* sentence.

- (7) The cat is sleeping there.
- (8) a. Neko-ga asoko-de nemut-tei-ru.
Neko-NOM there-at sleep-PROG-PRES
- b. Neko-wa asoko-de nemut-tei-ru
Neko-TOP there-at sleep-PROG-PRES

The two sentences in (8) serve to denote the same situation but differ in their judgment styles: in (8a), *ga* expresses athetic judgment, and in (8b), *wa* a categorical judgment. Kuroda (1992: 22) describes the notion of *thetic judgment* as “[t]he judgment expressed by [8a], ... is a direct response to the perceptual cognition of an actual situation, a perceptual intake of information about an actual situation. There is an actual situation in which a cat is sleeping there. This perception is directly put in the form of a judgement, registering a proposition taken as true with respect to the given situation.” *Categorical judgment*, in contrast, “does not simply reflect a perceptual intake of information, not a simple recognition by perception of the existence of an actual situation. In the judgment expressed by [8b], the cat in the perceived situation is apprehended as an entity that is fulfilling a particular role in the situation. (Kuroda 1992: 22-23).” Therefore, *thetic judgment* is a single judgment, while *categorical judgment* is a double judgment, as it involves the following two cognitive acts: recognizing something as an entity and ascribing to it a certain property perceived in a situation.

As Hasegawa (2010) warns, not all non-categorical judgment sentences are identified asthetic judgment sentences. For example, the sentence in (8a)

can be embedded under a predicate such as “*to omou* (think that),” but in this case, the embedded sentential content does not reflect the speaker’s direct perception, and is thus not seen as athetic judgment (*cf. neutral description* in Kuno (1973)). Through careful reconsideration, Hasegawa restricts thetic judgment sentences to the root sentences that have the following properties concerning predicate types, person restriction on the subject, and tense interpretation:

- (9) a. *Typical predicate types*: (i) of temporal-existence and emergence, such as *i-ru*, *a-ru* ‘be, exist’, *ku-ru* ‘come’, *tuk-u* ‘arrive’; (ii) of sudden/obvious change of state or temporal state, such as *koware-ru* ‘break-intr[ansitive].’, *oti-ru* ‘drop’, *byooki-da* ‘be sick’; (iii) activity/process predicates with *te-iru* ‘be-stative.’
- b. *Person restriction on the subject*: Neither the 1st person nor the 2nd person.
- c. *Tense interpretation*: the ‘non-perfect’ *-(r)u* form of activity/change predicates → the immediate perfect or the on-going aspect; the ‘perfect’ *-ta* form of activity/change predicates → the immediate perfect, not the simple past. (Hasegawa 2010: 11)

First, the predicate types listed in (9a) typically occur in thetic judgment sentences that express what the speaker has directly perceived at the time of speech : the described situations involve the existence of an entity (10a), an event that has just happened (10b) or is about to happen (10c), or a situation that the speaker has just realized (10d).

- (10) a. Oya, asoko-ni John-ga i-ru.
 Oh there-at John-NOM exist-PRES
 ‘Oh, John is there.’ (Hasegawa 2010: 8)
- b. Tegami-ga ki-ta.
 letter-NOM come-PAST

- ‘Mail has come.’ (Hasegawa 2010: 8)
- c. A! Kabin-ga oti-ru.
oh vase-NOM drop-PRES
‘Oh, the vase is going to drop!’ (Hasegawa 2010: 10)
- d. Neko-ga asoko-de nemut-te-i-ru.
cat-NOM there-in sleep-PROG-PRES
‘A cat is sleeping there.’ (Kuroda 1992: 13)

Second, the person restriction on the subject in (9b) is indicated by the fact that thetic judgment sentences cannot tolerate the first- and second-person pronouns (cf. *gensyoo-byoosya-bun* ‘sentence of phenomenon description’ (Nitta 1991) and *gensyoo-bun* ‘sentence of phenomenon’ (Inoue 2009)).

- (11) { * Watasi / * Anata / Kodomo }-ga hasit-te-i-ru.
I / you / child-NOM run-PROG-PRES
‘{ * I / * You / A child } is running.’ (Nitta 1991: 127)

The person restriction reflects the intuition that the speaker is not allowed to look at her/his own action or existence objectively and to describe it as if it were a new event (cf. Kuno 1973). Likewise, the use of the second-person pronoun, in general, indicates that the speaker first realizes the existence of the addressee in the discourse and attempts to attribute to her/him a certain property perceived in the situation; hence, the incompatibility of the second-person pronoun with thetic judgment sentences.

Third, the tense specification in (9c) is illustrated in (10a-d). For example, the ‘non-perfect’ *-(r)u* form of activity/change predicates must be interpreted as the immediate perfect (10c) or the on-going aspect (10d); the ‘perfect’ *-ta* form of activity/change predicates must obtain an immediate perfect interpretation (not the simple past one) (10b). Given these tense specifications on thetic judgment sentences, they do not fit well with a temporal modifier which refers to a past eventual time or a frequency adverb.

- (12) a. Hanako-ga 3-nen-mae-ni daigaku-o sotugyoosi-ta.
 Hanako-NOM -year-ago college-ACC graduate-PAST
 'Hanako graduated from a college three years ago.'
- b. Taro-ga itumo kimi-ni ai-ta-gat-te-iru.
 Taro-NOM always you-DAT meet-want-PROG-PAST
 'Taro always wants to meet you.'

(Hasegawa 2010: 11)

One of the crucial originalities of Hasegawa's (2010) approach lies in the theoretical implementation of the idea thatthetic judgment sentences constitute an independent clause type and can therefore be structurally distinguished from other sentences. Although Kuroda (1965, 1972, 1992) assumes that there is no syntactic difference betweenthetic judgment sentences and embedded propositions with *ga*-marked subjects, Hasegawa attempts to support her approach by revealing the parallelism betweenthetic judgment sentences and presentational sentences in English. The next subsection reviews this point in detail.

2.1.2. Locative inversion sentences as presentationals

Before reviewing Hasegawa's (2010) empirical characterization of presentationals in English, a word of caution is in order concerning the target linguistic phenomena. First, Hasegawa (2010) takes up locative inversion (LI) and the presentational-*there* construction as representative cases of presentational sentences in English, but due to space limitations, this paper focuses on LI. Second, adopting Emonds' (1976) transformational rule called *il rectional ad erbial preposing*, Hasegawa seems to call it LI, but this paper uses the term LI to refer to a more specific one in the following form: **PP**_[Locative/Directional] **Verb DP**.

It has been observed (e.g., Bolinger 1971) that LI in English is associated with the presentational function, which introduces a new entity to the discourse. Let us consider the following examples:

- (13) a. A huge toad jumped into the pond.
b. Into the pond jumped a huge toad.

Both the declarative sentence in (13a) and the LI sentence in (13b) seem to express the same situation, but the latter differs from the former in carrying the presentational function.

The idea of relating the presentational function of LI to *thetic judgment* itself is not brand-new (Fukuchi 1985), but its theoretical implementation was not possible at that time. In this connection, Hasegawa's (2010) work is of empirical and theoretical significance in revealing crucial similarities between thetic judgment sentences and LI. What follows reviews her characterization of LI while strengthening it by providing additional evidence and arguments.

First, LI, as well as thetic judgment sentences, is a main clause phenomenon.²

- (14) * I noticed that in came John. (Emonds 1976: 30)

Second, LI is, in general, restricted to unaccusative verbs (i.e., verbs of existence or emergence), as shown below (Bresnan 1994: 78):

- (15) a. On the corner was { standing / * drinking } a woman.
b. Toward me { lurched / * looked } a drunk.

Third, although Hasegawa (2010) does not provide detailed arguments on the nature of the person restriction, LI strongly resists the first- or second-person pronoun in the post-copular position, as observed by Takami (1995).

- (16) a. * Into the building ran I/ME/WE/US. (Takami 1995: 200)
b. * On the top of the mountain stood YOU. (Takami 1995: 200)

Fourth, the tense of LI is, in general, specified for the present and the simple

past, excluding auxiliaries of inference (except *will*) and the perfective.

- (17) a. Down the street rolled the baby carriage! (Emonds 1976: 29)
- b. Here comes the bus! (Hasegawa 2010: 12)
- c. * Down the hill may roll the baby carriage! (Coopmans 1989: 729)
- d. * Down the stairs has fallen the baby. (Coopmans 1989: 729)

Careful consideration, however, is necessary concerning the progressive form and the auxiliary *will* in the context of LI. Although LI tends to resist the progressive form, as Hasegawa (2010: 13) points out, LI allows the progressive form, especially when the predicate “expresses how or in what manner the subject exists but not how the subject has been acting.”

- (18) a. On the corner was standing a woman. (Bresnan 1994: 78)
- b. Down the hill will roll the baby carriage.

In addition, *will* may occur in LI only if the speaker has direct evidence to express an event that is about to happen right before her/his eyes.³ The tense specification of LI is quite similar to that ofthetic judgment sentences (see (9c)).

In summary, Hasegawa’s (2010) empirical characterization ofthetic judgment sentences and LI allows us to integrate them into the presentational clause type, which marks the propositional content as a directly perceived situation that is about to happen or has just happened before the speaker’s eyes. The next subsection introduces her syntactic analysis of presentationals, which is proposed on the basis of the cartographic framework.

2. 2. A Syntactic Approach to Clause Typing and Presentationals

Adopting the split CP structure proposed by Rizzi (1997), Hasegawa (2010) proposes an analysis of the presentational clause type. According to Rizzi’s split CP hypothesis, the traditional CP domain splits into multiple functional projections: Force, Topic, Focus, and Finite.⁴

- (19) a. Force ... *Topic ... Focus ... Finite IP ...
 b. He prayed THAT *atrocities like this e, never again would* he witness.
 (Radford 2004: 329, with modifications)
 c. FORCE (Subordination), *Topicalization*, Focus (Negation, *wh-Q*), Fin

The Force layer is responsible for encoding the clause type of a sentence (e.g. the Force head occupied by *that* marks the clause type as *d clarative* in (19b)). The Fin(ite) layer encodes the finiteness of a sentence, and the finiteness is realized on the I head; the Fin head can be targeted by an inverted auxiliary. The Topic layer and the Focus layer are sandwiched between Force and Fin.

The Force layer and the Fin layer in (19) directly reflect the dual role played by the CP system: clause typing and tense specification. Based on this point, Hasegawa (2010) proposes that the Force layer realize the presentational clause type and communicate with the Fin layer, thereby specifying particular tense interpretations and morphological forms on Fin. Under her system, clause types may be declaratives, questions, imperatives, and indicatives, and they are marked at the Force layer with the corresponding abstract features ([+Decl(arative)], [+Q(uestion)], [+Imp(erative)], and [+Ind(icative)], respectively). For example, in the case of *wh*-questions, the auxiliary moves to the Fin head, and the [+Q] feature on the Force head induces movement of a *wh*-word to [Spec, FocP].

- (20) a. What did you buy?
 b. [_{ForceP[+Q]} ... [_{FocP[+wh]} what_{[+wh]_j} [_{FinP} did_i [_{IP} you [_I t_i buy t_j]]]]]

Extending this analysis to presentationals, Hasegawa proposes that LI in English be derived based on the following assumptions. First, the Force head may involve the abstract feature [+P(resentational)], which triggers the fronting of a locative-directional PP to [Spec, ForceP]; as a result, the sentence is typed as a presentational clause. Second, the Force head is also specified for the [-1st, -2nd] person features. Third, the Force head with

point, all others are equal to the derivation of LI. The person restriction (see (11)) is accounted for as a result of the agreement relationship between the [-1st, -2nd] person feature on the Force head and the subject. Due to the presence of the [thetic] feature, the predicate with tense morphemes must be consistent with thetic judgments (see (10)).

Having reviewed Hasegawa's (2010) theoretical analysis of the presentational clause type, the next section attempts to provide further empirical evidence and arguments for her approach with special reference to participle preposing.

3. Further Extension: Participle Preposing

3.1. Proposal

Participle preposing, illustrated below, has been seen as an instance of the transformational rule known as preposing around Be (Emonds 1976: 36):

- (23) a. Speaking at today's lunch will be our local congressman.
b. Taking tickets at the door was a person I had previously roomed with.
c. Examined today and found in good health was our nation's chief executive.
d. Taking turns, as usual, were his two sisters.

The examples above show that a predicate taking either the progressive form or the passive form may occur in the sentence-initial position, while the logical subject occurs at the post-copular position. According to Emonds (1976), participle preposing, like LI, only occurs in the root context, as shown below:

- (24) * Bill said that taking turns, as usual, were his two sisters.
(Emonds 1976: 36)

Furthermore, the syntactic form of participle preposing (i.e., $VP_{\text{Participle}}-V\text{-DP}$)

looks similar to that of LI (i.e., **PP_{Locative}-V-DP**) in that a preposed element is followed by a verbal element, and the logical subject occurs post-verbally. These initial observations motivate the idea that participle preposing is derived on a par with LI, as illustrated below:

- (25) a. Speaking at today's lunch will be our local congressman. (= (23a))
 b. [_{ForceP}[+P]/[-1st, -2nd] speaking at today's lunch_j ... [_{FinP}[Thetic] will_i [_{IP} t_j [_Γ t_i [_{VP} be [_{SC} our local congressman_[-1st, -2nd] t_j]]]]]]]]

Under the assumption that the logical subject and the participle VP form a small clause (SC) (cf. Stowell 1981), the sentence with participle preposing in (23a) will be analyzed as in (25b). If such a unification of participle preposing into the presentational clause type is possible, then it will be predicted that participle preposing behaves similarly to LI in English. Confining the research target to the type of participle preposing with the progressive form, the next subsection provides supportive evidence for this possibility.⁶

3. 2. Supportive Evidence

The first piece of evidence for the theoretical treatment of participle preposing as the presentational clause type comes from Bolinger's (1971) observation that verbs that are directional and locational easily occur in participle preposing when they are unmodified, as the following contrast shows:

- (26) * {Standing / Eating / Working / Fighting} was my brother.
 (Bolinger 1971: 584-585)
- (27) a. Approaching was a strange sort of three-headed figure.
 b. Appearing was a never-before-seen conglomeration of bugs and worms.
 c. Emanating was a weird greenish vapor.
 (Bolinger 1971: 584-585)

Recall that LI is restricted to unaccusative verbs (i.e., verbs of appearance/existence), and the preposed PP must be locational/directional. The contrast above shows that a similar restriction is imposed on the preposed simple verb phrases: the preposed VPs are unaccusative verbs, which implies that the referents denoted by the post-copular DPs are introduced immediately before the speaker's eyes. Thus, the participle preposing sentences without arguments and modifiers clearly shows their restriction on the types of predicates.⁷

The second piece of evidence is provided by the fact that participle preposing resists inference auxiliaries, especially those that are incompatible with the presentational function.⁸

- (28) a. Playing first base { will be / is / was } John.
 b. Playing first base { ^{?(?)} must / ^{??} may } be John.

These facts are reminiscent of those in (17) and (18).

The third piece of evidence comes from the fact that the post-copular position must be occupied by third-person DPs (cf. (16)).⁹

- (29) Playing first base { * am I / * are you / is John }.

By observing the syntactic and semantic properties of the participle preposing with the progressive form, this subsection has provided additional arguments for Hasegawa's (2010) approach to the presentational clause type. The next section discusses some remaining issues revolving around the presentational function.

4. Remaining Issues: Emphasis beyond the Presentational Function

In accordance with Hasegawa's (2010) approach to the presentational clause type, this paper has argued that her approach is independently supported by participle preposing with the progressive form. However, there

are some remaining issues concerning the discourse function of presentational sentences in English.

First, it is a traditional observation that English presentationals are associated with “emphasis” in a certain sense. Presenting the following examples, Takami (1995: 195) argues that the post-verbal DP in LI must carry a more important piece of information which is “unpredictable” on the part of the hearer(s):¹⁰

- (30) a. ?? At the platform arrived a train.
 b. At the platform arrived an *antige* train.
- (31) Densya-ga purattohuoomu-ni tui-ta.
 train-NOM platform-at arrive-PAST

The point in (30a) is that LI becomes less acceptable because it describes an ordinary event that usually happens and does not carry any outstanding information. What is important here is thatthetic judgment sentences do not seem to show such a discourse-related effect, as is clear from the fact in (31) that the Japanese translation of (30a) is perfectly fine as athetic judgment sentence. Furthermore, Takami argues that a similar effect is also observed in participle preposing. The relevant difference will raise various issues, both empirical and theoretical, in treatingthetic judgment sentences on a par with presentational sentences in English. If the nature of the “emphatic” effect (described as “unpredictable”) in presentational sentences in English is identified under a certain linguistic concept, we will need at least two types of presentationals: the one with “emphasis” and the other without “emphasis.” In this connection, it is quite informative to look at the types of word order alternation patterns observed in Romance languages and German, which are reported to result inthetic judgment sentences with a flavor of “emphasis” (e.g., Cruschina 2011; Honda 2018). Independent research will be necessary for detailed comparisons betweenthetic judgment sentences in Japanese and presentationals in English, but will open a new possibility to characterize and

formalize the (potentially) two types of presentationals in terms of clause typing.

Second, one of the reviewers asked whether Hasegawa's (2010) analysis of LI have any consequences for *Right Edge Alignment of Focus*, which states that "[e]ach focused constituent is right-aligned in *ip* [= a root sentence] (Culicover and Winkler 2008: 640)." Due to this prosodic markedness constraint at the syntax-phonology interface, the post-verbal DP in the right-peripheral position receives a focal accent in LI (e.g. "Into my room came a CAT."); as a result, the post-verbal DP may realize either presentational or contrastive focus. Given this point, one possible answer is that the person-number agreement operation assumed in Hasegawa's analysis plays a role in specifying the type of focus realized on the post-verbal DP as presentational. An interesting issue raised here is whether contrastive stress on the post-verbal DP lifts the person restriction imposed on it. According to Hasegawa's analysis, the presentational function of LI is syntactically realized; therefore, it is predicted that contrastive stress on the post-verbal DP, in principle, cannot lift the person restriction. This issue needs to be carefully considered in the future research.

5. Concluding Remarks

Following Hasegawa (2010), this paper has provided further empirical evidence for her syntactic approach to the presentational clause type by extending it to participle preposing in English. On the empirical side, the paper has argued that participle preposing with the progressive form speaks to its presentational function. On the theoretical side, it has proved that English resorts to a fronting operation of a VP with the progressive form to the sentence-initial position ([Spec, ForceP]) in order to encode the clause type of the sentence as presentational.

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linguistics but also for providing me with invaluable teachings and advice on what is necessary for researchers at a university level. Even after getting my master's degree, her teachings and advice have long helped me to look back on my life positively, inspiring me to work harder. What she attempted to teach me in my master's course as a supervisor and in my Ph.D. course as the external committee member seemed to be far beyond my understanding, but it is only in recent years that I truly feel that I may be able to understand the significance of her painstaking work on various topics and issues in linguistics. The work presented here is an attempt to lend empirical support to her work on presentationals, which also led me to find another topic in my own research project.

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Footnotes

- ¹ The following abbreviations are used in the glosses throughout this paper: ACC = Accusative, NOM = Nominative, POL = Politeness marker, PRES = Present, PROG = Progressive, TOP = Topic marker.
- ² As pointed out by Hooper and Thompson (1973), LI can be embedded under the assertive predicates that behave like root clauses. In such a case, however, LI seems to lose its presentational function.
- ³ My informants all agreed that compared with *may* and *must*, *will* can be tolerable in LI only if it is used when the speaker has direct evidence in making a statement. In this sense, the auxiliary *will* is similar to the *-ru* form of the predicate *oti(-ru)* 'drop' in (10c), which expresses a situation that is about to happen before the speaker's eyes.
- ⁴ In Rizzi's (1997) original split CP hypothesis, Focus is sandwiched between Higher Topic and Lower Topic. As of the present, whether the presence of Lower Topic is empirically

proved in English, however, is still an ongoing issue, and so the simplified version presented here is adopted throughout this paper.

- ⁵ The communication between Force and Finite needs to be theoretically formalized, but I would like to leave this question open for future research.
- ⁶ The type of participle preposing with the passive form will need an independent study because it is unclear whether passive sentences can be seen asthetic judgment sentences in a strict sense at this moment. It has been reported in the literature (e.g., Bruening (2010)) that predicates with the passive form are allowed in LI, and so this fact may suggest that passivized predicates are compatible with the presentational function in LI.
- ⁷ Due to the presentational function, other verbs require modification by a directional/locational element or certain contextual information from which a directional/locational meaning is recovered.
- ⁸ I appreciate my informants for the native speaker judgments provided in (28) and (29). Although the selectional restriction on inference auxiliaries is relatively weakened in participle preposing, they observed that it still works in LI and participle preposing.
- ⁹ Three of my informants observed that the second-person pronoun occurs with relative ease when a sentence with participle preposing involves *will*. I would like to leave it as an open question why the (second) person restriction is weakened in such a case.
- ¹⁰ The concept of “more/less important information” does not necessarily overlap “new/old information” and “(phonologically marked) focus/presupposition.” According to Takami (1995: 135-141), “more/less important information” is concerned with the information structure of a single sentence, but “new/old information” and “focus/presupposition” crucially depend on the structure of discourse (e.g., question-answer pairs, the (in)compatibility of a sentence with the preceding discourse context).

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